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Subnational government entities benefit from federal funds to support programs and operations. 
There are a variety of factors that influence federal grant funds to recipients. This study seeks to 
identify the effects of multiple factors on federal grant allocation from the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) to state entities. The literature suggests three 
categories of factors affecting federal funding distribution, including problem severity and need, 
recipient capacity, and political motivation. I conduct a regression analysis to test the effects of 
these factors, using a pooled cross-sectional time-series data set. The results indicate that 
political motivation has a significant influence on federal grant distribution, primarily through 
representation in the House of Representatives majority party. These results help to explain the 




Mental health disorders are prevalent across the United States. In 2012, the United States 
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) found that about 27 million adults experienced 
feelings of sadness, and about 39 million experienced feelings of nervousness, at least some of 
the time 30 days prior to their interview (HHS, 2012). The Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration (SAMHSA) continues to lead the charge toward prevention and 
treatment of substance use and mental health issues in the U.S., yet these issues remain 
prevalent. Many individuals develop mental illness due to stressors that build over time, 
including a combination of economic, family, and discriminatory factors. Low-income 
individuals and families are at a higher risk of developing a mental illness due to these stressors, 
with the U.S. poverty rate at 12.3 percent in 2017, or about 40 million people (Fontenot et al., 
2018; Santiago et al., 2013).  
This study seeks to improve the understanding of mental health and substance use policy 
in the United States. More specifically, this study seeks to answer the question of how federal 
behavioral health grants to state entities are allocated. What are the determinants of behavioral 
health grants from SAMHSA? Is the distribution of funds related to need and problem severity, 
state governmental characteristics, political motivation, or unobserved factors? This research 
examines the determinants of federal behavioral health grants and the factors that may need 
further consideration from the federal government in grant allocation.  
 In order to answer these questions, this study discusses federal mental health and 
substance use policy and emphasizes the importance of proper funding mechanisms from the 
federal level to lower level governments and independent actors. The United States federal 
government provides financial support to many sectors, both public and private, in order to 
support their endeavors and to serve the public. Recipients require federal funding for different 
reasons, making its application unique to each sector (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992; DaRonco, 
2015; GAO, 2009; Immunotherapy Weekly, 2014; Lee, 2012; University Wire, 2017). 
Influencing factors on federal funding are different for different programs. The present study 
explores the influencing factors on grant funding from SAMHSA for mental health and 
substance abuse services.  
Federal funding is important for these sectors in order to address problems and support 
operations. This is also true for state and local governments, often lacking the capacity to address 
problems. The federal government plays a critical role in ensuring that all states and localities 
have access to resources in order to combat problems. In particular, the federal government plays 
such a role for social problems, as it reallocates national resources to states and localities, 
allowing those lower-level governments to have access to solutions for social problems. One 
such social problem requiring federal support is behavioral illness. Behavioral illness includes 
both broad categories of mental illness and substance abuse, often grouped together to streamline 
services.  
Behavioral illness requires intervention and funding from the federal government for 
three main reasons. The first is that behavioral health is a human rights issue, as individuals with 
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behavioral illness are forced to conform to societal norms and standards (Dhanda and Narayan, 
2007). This pressure to conform hinders an individual’s capacity and opportunity to act, 
therefore diminishing their basic human rights (Ryan and Deci, 2000). The second reason is that 
behavioral illness is a public health issue. Public health issues affect the health of entire 
populations from the local level to the national level (CDC, 2019). In the U.S. alone, one in five 
adults live with a mental illness (NIMH, 2019). As such, behavioral health as a public health 
issue affects the U.S. population at the national level. The third reason for the federal 
government to become involved is that behavioral illness is an economic burden, with global 
mental health costs totaling US $2.5 trillion in 2010 and estimated to reach US $6.0 trillion by 
2030 (Bloom et al., 2011, p. 27). High income countries such as the United States pay for about 
two-thirds of the global mental health burden, making it a topic of economic importance both 
domestic and abroad (Bloom et al., 2011).  
 
Policy Background  
As previously mentioned, the United States federal government provides financial 
support to a plethora of lower-level governments, agencies, research institutions, public entities, 
and so forth. The funding mechanisms vary between recipients based on recipient characteristics, 
previous mechanisms, power of actors, and enacted policy (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992; 
DaRonco, 2015; GAO, 2009; Immunotherapy Weekly, 2014; Lee, 2012; University Wire, 2017).  
For example, in the education sector, federal funding can be categorized as negotiated funding 
(based on the previous year and power of institutional actors), input funding (formula funding 
with such determining factors as the higher cost of education or higher than expected 
enrollment), and output funding based on performance (rewarding academic institutions for 
positive results) (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992). 
In order to address mental health problems, the United States Congress founded the 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) under the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) in 1992. Since its inception, SAMHSA has lead “public 
health efforts to advance the behavioral health of the nation and to improve the lives of 
individuals living with mental and substance use disorders, and their families” (SAMHSA, 2019, 
Who We Are, para. 1).  
SAMHSA offers grants for behavioral health to various state and territorial institutions. 
Among these grants are the Community Mental Health Services Block Grant (MHBG) and the 
Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grant (SABG), authorized by the Public 
Health Service (PHS) Act.  
Block grants are administered for a specific set of programs, yet have little restriction on 
how they are administered and for what purpose. Federal grants for behavioral health are most 
often block grants, such as the MHBG and SABG, allowing recipients to determine the proper 
application of funds (Dilger, 2018). SAMHSA also allocates thousands of other grants, notably 
falling under Projects of Regional and National Significance and Drug-Free Communities 
Support Programs (USASpending, 2019).  
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The MHBG was developed in 1981 under the Reagan administration in an effort to give 
more fiscal freedom to states under new federalism. The MHBG allowed states to disseminate 
funds based on local needs, as determined by their state mental health agency. In 1982, this block 
grant was implemented and managed by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and was 
transferred to SAMHSA after its inception in 1992 (NASMHPD, 2007). The MHBG is now 
administered by the Center for Mental Health Services, within the Administration (SAMHSA, 
2017a). 
The SABG was established in 1993 under The Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health 
Administration Reorganization Act (ADAMHA), amending the PHS Act. The SABG is currently 
the “largest Federal program dedicated to improving publicly-funded substance abuse prevention 
and treatment systems” (SAMHSA, Fact Sheet, para. 1). The SABG provides funding to states, 
territories, and one Indian tribe to combat substance abuse. It is jointly administered by the 
SAMHSA Center for Substance Abuse Prevention and the Center for Substance Abuse 
Treatment (SAMHSA, 2017b). 
In fiscal year 2018, SAMHSA allotted $722 million in MHBG funding and $1.7 billion in 
SABG funding (Ashwood et al., 2019). These noncompetitive block grant allotments are 
calculated based on formulas developed by the agency and are allotted based on a thorough 
application and reporting process. The three core components of these formulas are recipient 
population, cost of services, and fiscal capacity. Grants from federal agencies, such as 
SAMHSA, are the second largest sources of funding for mental health and substance use 
programs (MHA, 2019).  
Each of these grants has a list of targeted populations and service areas as designated by 
ADAMHA and updated by the Children’s Health Act of 2000. The MHBG targeted populations 
include adults with serious mental illness and children with serious emotional disturbances. The 
SABG targeted populations include pregnant women and women with dependent children, 
intravenous drug users, tuberculosis services, early intervention services for HIV/AIDS, and 
primary prevention services (SAMHSA, 2017a, 2017b).  
In order to receive funding for their programs, SAMHSA develops an annual budget 
proposal, presented to the Senate and House Appropriations Committee for approval. The 
SAMHSA Congressional Justification provides detailed explanations for programs and services 
included in the annual budget proposal to Congress. This is then used by the Senate and House 
Appropriations Committee to make funding decisions to SAMHSA. A graphic showing the 
funding relationships between SAMHSA, state mental health agencies (SMHAs), state 




Figure 1: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Agency Funding Flowchart 
 
 
As seen in Figure 2, all congressional spending is divided between discretionary and 
mandatory spending. Discretionary spending includes appropriations and authorizations. 
Appropriation spending decisions are made solely by the House and Senate Appropriations 
Committees with a “top-down” funding structure, meaning the total amount is decided first and 
programs then compete against each other within these limits. Authorizations are decided under 
jurisdiction of select legislative committees (Tollestrup, 2016). Annual funding to SAMHSA is 
categorized as appropriations. 
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Mandatory spending includes entitlement programs such as Social Security, Medicaid, 
and Medicare. One such mandatory spending program, Medicaid, remains the largest single 
payer source of funding for mental health and substance use services (Sampat et al., 2013).The 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 allows states to expand their 
Medicaid program as early as January 1, 2011. Medicaid expansion allows “all children, parents 
and childless adults who are not entitled to Medicare and who have family incomes up to 133 
percent” of the federal poverty line (FPL) to qualify for Medicaid beginning in 2014 (U.S. 
Senate, p. 3).  
Under the ACA, mandates are given to all marketplace health plans in a list of ten 
Essential Health Benefits. These benefits include ambulance services, emergency services, 
hospitalization, pregnancy care, mental health and substance abuse services, prescription drugs, 
rehabilitative services, laboratory services, preventive and chronic illness care, and pediatric 
services. The ACA expands access to mental health care under these required benefits, 
continuing the notion that the federal level should ensure individuals are covered.  
Health agencies such as SAMHSA continue to support behavioral illness abatement by 
providing grants to states. Unlike Medicaid and Medicare, SAMHSA block grants are not based 
on reimbursement, providing flexibility for states to allocate their financial resources. Although 
the MHBG and SABG are based on formulas, they are also based on recipient performance 















formula, submit an application, submit annual service plans to support targeted populations, and 
submit annual reports evaluating the previous year’s plan (SAMHSA, 2017a, 2017b).  
 
Literature Review and Theory 
 In reviewing the relevant literature, I explore determinants of federal grant allocation 
from a broad perspective, including various sectors and state programs as recipients. Previous 
literature has discerned patterns in the distribution of federal funding to lower levels of 
government (Alvarez and Saving, 1997; Atlas et al., 1995; Bickers and Stein, 2000; Hall, 2008; 
Hall, 2010; Holcombe and Zardhooki, 1981; Hoover and Pecorino, 2003; Howsen and Lile, 
2011; Knight, 2002; Larcinese et al., 2013; Levitt and Snyder, 1995; Rich, 1989; Sampat et al., 
2013). Figure 3 represents a compilation of these influencing factors as they relate to federal 
funding, as based on the literature.   
 
Figure 3: Factors Influencing Federal Funding, as Based on the Literature 
 
 
The literature suggests three overarching determinant categories of federal funding, or 
grants allocated to subnational entities. These three categories include problem severity and the 
need of recipients, characteristics of subnational government recipients, and political motivation. 
Conceptually, federal funding mechanisms to lower level governments in particular can be 
viewed through one of two lenses. Public choice theory suggests that funding decisions are made 
to accommodate the public good. It asserts that the government, and its influential stakeholders, 
seek to address problems that hinder public welfare. Under this theory, actors in positions of 
political power will set aside their personal motivations in order to serve the greater good, often 
through regulation, taxation, and spending (Garret and Sobel, 2003). In opposition to public 
choice theory, pork barrel theory suggests that actors in positions of power are inclined to serve 




















interests and priorities and continue to funnel money to those interests. The theory suggests that 
government officials and their staff members will spend substantial time addressing certain 
issues in order to satisfy constituent groups, therefore garnering more votes and beginning a 
vicious pork barrel cycle (Maskin and Tirole, 2019). 
I will review the previous literature as it relates to each factor. Drawing on this body of 
literature, I propose a theoretical framework, based on need and problem severity, state 
governmental characteristics, and political motivation, to explain the distribution of federal 
grants for behavioral health programs. 
 
Problem Severity and Need 
As previously mentioned, the federal government provides funding to lower levels of 
government to assist in addressing local social problems. This funding supports programs 
implemented at the state and local level to address issues such as unemployment and poverty. 
States with higher levels of need are often targets of federal funding. The purpose of targeting is 
to “alleviate fiscal disparities among state and local governments” (Morgan and Shih, 1991, p. 
60). Such components of need are strong determinants of federal funding, as evident in the 
literature (Atlas et al., 1995; Bickers and Stein, 2000; Hall, 2008; Howsen and Lile, 2011; Levitt 
and Snyder, 1995). The literature shows that low income and high unemployment rates are 
associated with greater total amounts of federal grants to lower level governments (Levitt and 
Snyder, 1995). The literature also shows that these measures of need are related to greater federal 
funding for entitlement programs, such as Medicare and Social Security, and for programs with 
high variation between localities, such as highway construction and local education grants 
(Bickers and Stein, 2000; Hall, 2008; Hoover and Pecorino, 2003; Howsen and Lile, 2011; Levit 
et al., 2013).  
For example, Hall (2008) utilizes the Federal Assistance Award Data System (FAADS), a 
compilation of all annual federal domestic assistance to localities, to examine the determinants of 
federal grants. He shows that per capita income is related to more total federal grant amounts, 
total number of grants, and total grant amounts per capita (Hall, 2008). Similarly, Levitt and 
Snyder (1995) utilize the FAADS, compiled by Bickers and Stein (2000), in their analysis of 
federal funding allocation to local districts. They find that low income districts receive 
disproportionately more funding through non-formula programs than formula programs. 
Atlas et al. (1995) also find that lower per capita income is related to more federal outlays 
to local areas. Hoover and Pecorino (2003) find that states with high populations receive less 
total federal spending than states with low populations, and this translates to high populous states 
receiving less federal spending per capita. They also find that per capita income is negatively 
related to federal spending, suggesting that federal outlays are redistributive with regard to 
income. 
Howsen and Lile (2011) analyze the economic factors that determine per capita funding 
from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. They include poverty and 
unemployment rates as the economic factors in their regression analysis. Although there is no 
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relation between poverty and per capita funding from ARRA, they find that higher 
unemployment rates are related to more per capita funding from ARRA. Likewise, in 
determining the differences in spending trends at the federal level, Bickers and Stein (2000) use 
the FAADS to find that congressional entitlement spending for individuals increased as 
unemployment rates increased, and entitlement spending for individuals decreased as per capita 
income increased. 
Rich (1989) found that the ability of the federal government to allocate funding to 
distressed cities has increased over time. Geographical areas with high levels of unemployment, 
high levels of poverty, low average per capita income, and low population levels will be targets 
of federal funding, specifically through categorical and project grant programs (Aronson and 
Hilley, 1986). 
The severity of public problems and need factors can also include non-socioeconomic 
characteristics of a state.  Sampat et al. (2013) analyze the Research, Condition, and Disease 
Categorization system (RCDC) to examine the impact of disease deaths and hospitalization on 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding. The RCDC system allows for transparency of 
disaggregated federal funding and disease reporting into a standardized system. Sampat et al. 
(2013) find that both measures of disease burden, deaths and hospitalization, were associated 
with more NIH funding. More disease burden is directly related to more NIH funding, for both 
targeted and non-targeted grants. This suggests that increased problem severity of an illness is 
related to more federal funding.  
It is important to control for the socioeconomic characteristics when examining the 
severity of the mental health problem, as the literature proves that greater need generates greater 
federal funding (Atlas et al., 1995; Bickers and Stein, 2000; Hall, 2008; Hall, 2010; Hollingshead 
and Redlich, 1958; Howsen and Lile, 2011; Levitt and Snyder, 1995; Linn et al., 1985; Sturm 
and Gresenz, 2002). Based on public choice theory, I propose that mental health problem 
severity will lead to greater federal funding. That is, states with more individuals with mental 
illness, or states with a greater prevalence of mental illness, will likely receive more federal aid 
for mental health.  
 
Hypothesis 1: A state with more adults living with mental illness receive more funding through 
grants from SAMHSA. 
 
Government Capacity 
 While need and problem severity are key components in this way, federal funding first 
filters through state and local governments to address these issues. With this, characteristics of 
the recipient government also affect the distribution and acquisition of federal funding (Hall, 
2008; Levit et al., 2013; Rich, 1989; Sommers and Gruber, 2017).  
 An important measure of a state government is its capacity, or its resources available in 
order to function and apply for funding. Hall (2008) examines the impact of capacity on federal 
funding to local areas, using grant funding from the FAADS. He measures financial capacity as 
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county-area own-source revenues per capita, obtained from the Compendium of Government 
Finances. He measures administrative capacity as local government full-time employment, 
obtained from the Compendium of Government Employment. Hall (2008) finds that an increase 
in local government own-source revenues, or financial capacity, results in an increase of total 
federal grants and number of grants per person. However, an increase in local government own-
source revenues results in lower federal grant amounts, likely due to lower demand of local 
governments for federal funding. In regards to administrative capacity, a greater number of 
employees in a local government is related to more grant receipts, likely due to more employees 
that are available to apply for grants and manage existing grants. 
 Rich (1989) examines the influence of three factors local demand and administrative 
capacity on federal funding distribution to local areas. He assesses six grant programs 
administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Economic 
Development Administration (EDA), including Urban Renewal, Model Cities, Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG), Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG), Title I Public 
Works, and Local Public Works (LPW). He employs a regression analysis and finds that more 
local demand and capacity, or more local area spending and grant applications, results in more 
federal funding. He finds that “urban renewal allocations were based on the size and scale of the 
local projects submitted for HUD approval,” and areas with more federal grant applications 
received higher amounts of federal funding through UDAG (Rich, 1989, p. 208).  
 In terms of funding for behavioral health, the impact of lower level government capacity 
is a key governmental characteristic that impacts federal funding. State capacity is the 
culmination of resources at a government’s disposal, most often separated into internal and 
external capacity. Internal capacity includes staffing and finances, the most common resources 
available for a state government. External capacity includes outside influences of politics, 
economics, and social contexts (Hall, 2008). This study focuses on internal capacity, since 
external capacity is more closely linked to the other two major factors included in the present 
theory. 
The literature shows that economic or financial resources are important in defining 
capacity for an entity, with more capacity being beneficial (Grodzins, 2000; Hall, 2002). A state 
with more economic resources has a stronger capacity to apply for federal funding and to match 
funds from federal programs. Hall (2008) finds that greater average revenue of local 
governments is related to an increased total number of federal grants and grants per capita. That 
is, a higher financial capacity within a state or local government is related to more federal 
outlays allocated to that government. Financial capacity will be represented by SMHA 
expenditures in this study, with greater annual expenditures signaling a larger state agency. As 
previously mentioned, the formula used to calculate SAMHSA block grant funding includes 
three core components of recipient population, cost of services, and fiscal capacity. Grant 
recipient characteristics are key in determining the allocation of funds. Therefore, I propose: 
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Hypothesis 2: Greater financial capacity of a SMHA will result in more federal funding through 
grants from SAMHSA. 
  
During the recession of 2008-2009, millions of people lost employer-based health 
insurance in the United States, causing approximately 6 million people to enroll in Medicaid 
(Levit et al., 2013). In a study examining federal spending for behavioral health during the 
recession, Levit et al. (2013) show that all health spending growth was slowed during the 
recession, with a slight upturn a few years later. With the expansion of Medicaid in 2014, they 
expect an increase in federal spending for behavioral health and less pressure for state and local 
mental health agency spending. This suggests that state Medicaid expansion under the ACA will 
be related to more federal funding for behavioral health through the Medicaid program. 
Sommers and Gruber (2017) analyze the annual State Expenditure Reports by the 
National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO) in order to examine the impact of state 
Medicaid expansion on total spending. Their study implements a quantitative analysis of budget 
effects across all states, including both Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states, to 
supplement previous research that merely scratched the surface of expansion effects. The data 
shows the category of spending and the source of funding through state spending reports. They 
find that expanding Medicaid coverage is related to more federal spending. More specifically, 
states with expanded Medicaid have an average spending increase of 11.7 percent, primarily 
from federal funding. 
Medicaid eligibility is dependent on multiple factors, specifically disability status, age, 
and income (CMS 1). More importantly, Medicaid eligibility is dependent on whether a state has 
expanded their Medicaid program under the Affordable Care Act. Sommers and Gruber (2017) 
find evidence that state Medicaid expansion leads to large increases in federal Medicaid 
spending, but does not alter state spending. Medicaid is also the largest single payer for mental 
health treatment in the United States (Sampat et al., 2013). In alignment with Levit et al. (2013), 
state expansion of Medicaid is expected to relieve pressure on state mental health agencies. State 
Medicaid expansion will result in more federal funding through Medicaid for behavioral health, 
and less from state mental health agencies and other federal agencies.  
Thus it can be expected that states that have adopted the ACA Medicaid expansion will 
receive more federal funding for behavioral health through Medicaid. This is likely due to crowd 
out, a phenomenon that occurs when increased government involvement decreases involvement 
from other actors. The expansion of Medicaid may crowd out grant funding as state behavioral 
health grant applicants apply for fewer federal grants. It can then be expected that these states 
with expanded Medicaid programs receive less federal funding for behavioral health through 
other agencies such as SAMHSA, due to increased support from Medicaid. 
 
Hypothesis 3: A state that has expanded their Medicaid program will receive less federal funding 




 The literature also describes a third factor of federal benefit distribution, that of political 
motivation (Alvarez and Saving, 1997; Atlas et al., 1995; Bickers and Stein, 2000; Holcombe 
and Zardhooki, 1981; Hoover and Pecorino, 2003; Howsen and Lile, 2011; Levitt and Snyder, 
1995; Nicholson-Crotty, 2015). Political motivation occurs at all levels of government, with 
politicians constantly seeking constituent support, votes, re-election, and benefits for the area 
they represent. This is most evident through pork barrel politics, as elected officials attempt to 
direct funds and services to their constituents in exchange for votes. Governors and U.S. 
Senators use pork barrel tactics to drive federal benefits to their state, while district 
representatives in the House use these tactics to drive federal benefits to their own districts. The 
political influence of these officials, including their affiliated political party, has been shown to 
impact the allocation of federal funding to lower levels of government. 
With regard to political motivation in this study, I consider the influence of gubernatorial 
political party, House of Representatives majority delegation, Senate Health, Education, Labor 
and Pensions Committee representation, and House Ways and Means Committee representation. 
Nicholson-Crotty (2015) shows the influence of politics on federal funding through 
multiple empirical analyses of six unique federal grant programs. He shows that governors 
receive more federal funds from programs that typically align with their core constituency 
preferences. Additionally, Nicholson-Crotty (2015) shows that governors use pork barrel 
spending to support core constituencies. That is, right-leaning governors rely on grants from the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), as opposed to their left-leaning counterparts that rely on grants 
from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Likewise, right-leaning governors 
favor small government and therefore their states apply for and receive less grant money. 
Democratic governors and constituencies are more likely to support federal spending in 
general, including applying for and receiving federal grant funding. In a study examining the role 
of political parties in the geographic distribution of federal outlays, Levitt and Snyder (1995) 
utilize the FAADS. They conduct a regression analysis to find the impacts of political factors and 
demographic factors on the geographic distribution of federal outlays. They find that areas with 
large Democratic voter populations receive more federal outlays, and this is most prevalent 
among small federal assistance programs that target less geographically diffuse areas.  
In a study comparing outlays between the Democratically controlled 103rd Congress with 
the Republican controlled 104th Congress, Bickers and Stein (2000) look for the impact of 
partisan control. Their analysis uses three types of funding from the FAADS, including 
entitlements, discretionary awards, and obligations for contingent liability programs. They 
postulate that spending on healthcare, formula funding, and entitlement programs will be higher 
under Democratic control because Democrats consistently support these programs, since they 
benefit core constituencies such as elderly and minority groups. Additionally, they show that a 
Republican control of Congress is related to more outlays for contingent liability programs, 
mostly issued to for-profit businesses that make up the core Republican constituency.  
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Focusing on the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, Howsen 
and Lile (2011) find that states with greater electoral votes per capita receive more federal 
outlays per capita. During a time of Democratic majority in the Senate, House, and presidency, 
the authors argue that Democrats wish to continue being the majority party and continue to have 
a Democratic President. Thus, Democrats are more likely to spend based on state electoral votes 
per capita in an attempt to “maximize votes to retain office” (Howsen and Lile, 2011, p. 264). In 
alignment with pork barrel theory, elected officials will allocate funds to their political party and 
constituents in order to remain in political power. Howsen and Lile (2011) also mention the 
importance of political party in their study because Democrats in Congress are more likely to 
favor states with Democratic governors. 
This last point is important to note for the present study because SAMHSA grant funding 
combines Congressional and gubernatorial politics. Governors create annual or biannual budgets 
that state mental health agencies can utilize, in order to apply for and maintain grants from 
SAMHSA, which are then authorized and supervised by Congress.     
In the constant pursuit of re-election, governors are apt to provide resources that benefit 
their constituents and states. The theory of fiscal federalism and pork barrel spending explain 
why a governor funnels funds to areas most supported by their core constituents. A Republican 
state in favor of small government and lower spending will likely have a governor that applies 
for and receives less federal grants. Nicholson-Crotty (2015) argues that Democratic governors 
are more likely to prefer grants from such agencies as HHS than the DOJ, due to the core 
Democratic constituency preference of redistributive grants. Likewise, it is expected that states 
with Democratic governors are more likely to apply for and receive grants for health care, 
specifically from the HHS. As SAMHSA exists under the HHS, this hypothesis can be extended 
further to suggest that states with Democratic governors are more likely to apply for and receive 
grants for behavioral health. 
 
Hypothesis 4: A state with a Democratic governor will receive more federal funding through 
grants from SAMHSA. 
  
Members of Congress seek to benefit their constituencies within their districts and states. 
As opposed to the Senate, the House of Representatives functions with proportional 
representation. This limits the effect of per capita representation on federal outlays from the 
House. Though, the House is comprised of more congresspersons, with more potential for pork 
barrel politics on federal outlays (Denemark, 2000). Pork barrel politics is likely more prevalent 
in the House than in the Senate, as representatives attempt to satisfy constituents in their districts 
in order to be re-elected typically every two years (Hall, 2008). Pork barrel politics is two-fold 
and often one-in-the-same for representatives, with a strong desire to benefit their election 
districts, yet also satisfy their affiliated political party. 
Levitt and Snyder (1995) affirm that the majority party directs funds to their party-
controlled districts. They explain this by the “strong party” model, suggesting that the majority 
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party can target expenditures to their districts more quickly than the minority party, providing 
them more pork barrel power.  
Levitt and Snyder (1995) also look into the pattern of federal domestic outlays from 
Congress. As previously mentioned, this pattern is disproportionately in favor of Democrats due 
to a Democratic control over both the House and Senate. This allows Democrats to create a 
“portfolio” of programs on which to prioritize spending, favoring their constituents.   
Bickers and Stein (2000) suggest that there are strong differences in federal funding 
allocation due to the majority party in Congress. The majority party is the political party with the 
most representatives, therefore controlling the chamber. A state with more representatives in the 
majority party will likely have more political power and more influence on the allocation of 
federal funds. A representative not only attempts to satisfy their local district, but they also 
attempt to maintain in good standing with their political party, especially if it is the majority 
party. Thus, a state with more representatives in the House majority party will likely receive 
more federal outlays due to their increased political influence. 
 
Hypothesis 5: A state with a greater percentage of representatives in the majority party receive 
more federal funding through grants from SAMHSA. 
 
Holcombe and Zardhooki (1981) examine the economic and political factors that affect 
federal grant distribution. They find that political influences are stronger than other factors. More 
specifically, they show that states with a larger percentage of majority party members in the 
House, and states with members on key congressional committees receive more federal benefits 
per capita than their counterparts (Holcombe and Zardhooki, 1981, p. 399). In line with Levitt 
and Snyder (1995), “strong party” politics and pork barrel spending allow Congresspersons to 
use their political power to benefit their constituents and districts. Despite the presence of 
formulas in spending and grant funding, there remains party control based on political power 
(Holcombe and Zardhooki, 1981). 
Alvarez and Saving (1997) analyze the impact of congressional committee representation 
on federal outlays to congressional districts. They use the U.S. Domestic Assistance Programs 
Database, a system that includes all federal outlays, disaggregated by program. They find that 
representatives continue to divert funding to their districts, most likely through pork barrel 
politics, with more new outlays going to Democratic members. Alvarez and Saving (1997) also 
show that membership on key congressional committees results in more outlays for the 
members’ districts, because that Congresspersons can use their political power to influence the 
allocation of benefits to their representing districts or states.  
Likewise, members of Congress have the opportunity to join various committees on 
which they may formulate and propose new legislation. In order to streamline constituent goals, 
pork barrel agendas and personal goals, members of Congress may elect to join specific 
committees. Previous research has shown that representatives on key congressional committees 
receive more federal outlays (Holcombe and Zardhooki, 1981; Alvarez and Saving, 1997; 
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Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Clemens et al., 2015). Congressional committees direct the flow 
of funds for their policy areas, with membership acting as a major part of the distribution process 
(Clemens et al., 2015).  
This study focuses primarily on healthcare and behavioral healthcare policy. In the 
Senate, the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee directs all healthcare 
policy within the upper chamber. In the House, the Ways and Means Committee contains the 
Health subcommittee, among others, which then directs all healthcare policy within the lower 
chamber. It can be assumed that membership on these committees will benefit the member 
representatives with more federal outlays for those programs. 
 
Hypothesis 6: A state with representatives on the congressional committees that make policy 





 The dependent variables in this study are federal grants to states for behavioral health 
programs, specifically the Community Mental Health Services Block Grant (MHBG) and the 
Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grant (SABG), both awarded by the 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). This data comes from 
USA Spending and includes all assistance awards from SAMHSA. The data are aggregated by 
year, by state, and by grant type.  
  
Independent Variables 
 Based on my theoretical framework, my independent variables measure a state’s problem 
severity in mental health, state government capacity, factors related to political motivation, and 
other control variables on federal grants.  
To measure problem severity, I use the mental health state prevalence estimates from 
SAMHSA. Mental health state prevalence estimates come from the National Survey on Drug 
Use and Health (NSDUH), administered by the SAMHSA Center for Behavioral Health 
Statistics and Quality. The NSDUH is an annual survey conducted across all 50 states and the 
District of Columbia, including annual average percentages for various drug and health 
categories. I include mental health state prevalence estimates for any mental illness and serious 
mental illness for all persons equal to or greater than eighteen years of age, by state, from 2008-
2017. 
In this research, the measure of state government capacity is based on the size of a state’s 
mental health agency. For the purpose of this study, and its focus on mental health, I quantify 
capacity as annual expenditures by state mental health agencies. State mental health agency 
annual expenditures between 2008-2013 are drawn from the National Association of State 
Mental Health Program Directors Research Institute, Inc. (NRI). State mental health agency 
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annual expenditures between 2013-2017 are accessed from the Center for Mental Health 
Services (CMHS) Uniform Reporting System (URS) through SAMHSA. The URS is a 
collaborative system developed by the federal government, in which state mental health agencies 
input data regarding mental health client characteristics and expenditures. It is used by state 
mental health agencies to report annual data, which is then included in the annual MHBG 
application from SAMHSA. 
Medicaid expansion is considered as a dummy variable in this study, with 1 indicating a 
state has expanded their state Medicaid program and 0 indicating no expansion. State Medicaid 
expansion data is obtained from “tracking and analysis of state executive activity” by the Kaiser 
Family Foundation (KFF, 2019).  
There are three political variables considered in this study as well. The first is 
gubernatorial political party, included as a dummy variable, with 1 representing a state as having 
a Democratic governor, and 0 representing a state as having a non-Democratic governor. This 
information is obtained from the Council of State Governments: Knowledge Center. The second 
political variable is majority party membership in the House of Representatives. This is 
measured by taking the number of a state’s delegates in the majority party and dividing it by the 
number of majority party members in the entire House. Information regarding House party 
membership is from Congress.gov, operated by the Library of Congress. The final political 
variable is membership of elected representatives on key congressional committees that are 
responsible for allocating funding for public health programs. The Senate Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions Committee, alongside the House Ways and Means Committee, are 
responsible for the direction and proposal of new healthcare policy within their respective 
chambers. For this study, membership on such committees is quantified as a dummy variable. A 
state with representation on a key committee receives a 1, while a state without representation on 
a key committee receives a 0. Congressional committee data is from Congress.gov, maintained 
by the Library of Congress.   
 
Control Variables 
Following the research of Sampat et al. (2013) and Nicholson-Crotty (2015), this study 
controls for a state’s socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Based on the previous 
literature (Atlas et al., 1995; Bickers and Stein, 2000; Hall, 2008; Howsen and Lile, 2011; Levitt 
and Snyder, 1995; Nicholson-Crotty, 2015; Sampat et al, 2013), I choose the control variables of 
unemployment rate, personal income per capita, state population, poverty rate, and race.   
Unemployment rates spiked between 2007-2009, with the loss of over 6 million jobs. The 
recession, as well as pockets of unemployment in impoverished areas of states, are important to 
recognize when determining grant allocation, as they may influence the results. Greater levels of 
unemployment are shown to be related to greater levels of all federal funding (Aronson and 
Hilley, 1986; Bickers and Stein, 2000; Howsen and Lile, 2011). Unemployment is also a 
common factor among Medicaid recipients, causing more federal funding to be allocated to these 
populations. Unemployment rate data is obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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 This study also controls for personal income. The literature suggests that income is 
inversely related to all federal funding, with lower income populations receiving more federal 
support (Atlas et al., 1995; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Hall, 2008; Holcombe and Zardhooki, 
1981; Hoover and Pecorino, 2003; Levitt and Snyder, 1995). Low income is also a requirement 
for enrollment in Medicaid, with a strong relationship between income dynamics and Medicaid 
allocation per capita (Larcinese et al., 2013). The results of this study may show geographic 
favorability for states with high volumes of Medicaid enrollees. Per capita income data is also 
obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce.   
State population is included as another control in this study, following the work of Hall 
(2008), Rich (1989), and Nicholson-Crotty (2015). State population has been found to be 
inversely related to federal funding per capita (Atlas et al., 1995; Hoover and Pecorino, 2003; 
Larcinese et al., 2013), yet has also been found to have a small or positive effect on federal 
funding per capita (Holcombe and Zardhooki, 1981; Levitt and Snyder, 1995). To prevent faulty 
results, population acts as a control variable in this study, and state representation acts as an 
explanatory variable. State population is obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 This study also controls for poverty. The federal government establishes a Federal 
Poverty Level (FPL) each year, calculated based on the U.S. Census (HHS, 2017). Medicaid 
eligibility is based on individual or family income, as a percentage of the FPL. Areas with high 
levels of poverty are thus likely to see high levels of Medicaid enrollment. Areas with high levels 
of poverty are also likely to be targets of federal funding, primarily through categorical and 
project grant programs (Aronson and Hilley, 1986). This study controls for poverty rates to 
account these factors and for the high levels of poverty in urban areas, particularly in large cities 
(Berube and Frey, 2002). Poverty rate data is also obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 In this study, I also account for a state’s race characteristics. The majority of 
impoverished individuals in the U.S. are racial or ethnic minorities, that is, people other than 
non-Hispanic whites (Proctor et al., 2016). About 61.8 percent of America’s poor identify as a 
racial or ethnic minority, as of 2014 (Proctor et al., 2016). In addition to poverty, minority 
populations withstand racism and discrimination that result in greater physiological, social, and 
psychological stress levels (Clark et al, 1999). Such stress levels put minority groups at more of a 
risk of developing mental disorders, especially depression and anxiety (HHS, 2001). As such, 
areas with greater populations of racial minorities are likely to have greater prevalence of mental 
illness. This study controls for race to account for economic and mental health discrepancies. 
More specifically, this study uses the proportion of a state’s population that is black. Race data 
come from the U.S.Census Bureau. 
 This study includes data from 2008-2017 to account for the introduction of the 
Affordable Care Act and the option for states to expand their Medicaid programs. Table 1 




Table 1: Summary Statistics 





SABG per capita 510 1.853833 .180784 1.115572 2.525315 
MHBG per capita 510 .8972659 .1881207 .5228127 1.620071 
Total funding per capita 510 2.511439 .3784778 1.931345 4.604829 
Independent Variables 
Proportion of state 
population with any 
mental illness 
510 18.33549 2.047646 11.69068 25.0336 
Proportion of state 
population with 
serious mental illness 
510 4.191289 .6261492 2.591875 6.1775 
SMHA spending per 
capita 
510 4.735649 .5988718 3.13286 6.221267 
State has a Democratic 
Governor 
500 .426 .4949889 0 1 
Proportion of 
Representatives in 
House majority party 
510 2.008471 2.228708 0 15.45064 
State has at least one 
Representative on 
House Ways and 
Means Committee 
500 .478 .500016 0 1 
State has at least one 
Senator on Senate 
Health, Education, 
Labor and Pensions 
Committee 
500 .432 .4958505 0 1 
Unemployment rate 510 6.460784 2.193371 2.4 13.7 
Personal income per 
capita 
510 44.17508 8.454947 29.80089 79.98946 
Poverty rate 510 13.44902 3.378138 6.4 23.1 
Population 510 15.13447 1.032584 13.21045 17.49274 
State Medicaid 
expansion 
510 .2372549 .4258175 0 1 
Proportion of state 
population that is 
black 






The three types of funding in this study can be directly compared in Figure 4. Naturally, 
total SAMHSA grant funding is greater than the two major block grants. On average, total grant 
funding equates to about $3164 million annually. SABG consistently accounts for about half of 
total SAMHSA grant funding, yet slips to approximately 40 percent of total funding in 2017. 
Annual funding for SABG is about $1681 million on average. MHBG funding hovers around 15 
percent of total funding and increases to about 24 percent in 2017. Over the decade span shown 
in Figure 4, MHBG funding is consistently lower than SABG funding. Average MHBG funding 
is about $484 million annually. 
 
Figure 4: SAMHSA Grant Funding 2007-2017 (in millions of USD)
 
 
To provide cross-state comparison of mental illness problem severity, Table 2 and Table 
3 show the 50 states ranked from highest to lowest prevalence of any mental illness and serious 
mental illness, respectively. The level of any mental illness ranges widely, from 15.80 to 21.45 
percent. A difference of almost six percent shows the disparity between states in terms of mental 
health. A disparity is also seen in the levels of serious mental illness, yet to a smaller degree. 
Among the states, serious mental illness ranges from 3.29 to 5.20 percent. This can potentially be 
explained by the political affiliation of each state. The ten states with the highest levels of mental 
illness are primarily Republican, for both any mental illness and serious mental illness. The ten 
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states with the lowest levels of mental illness are either Democratic or battleground states, for 
both any mental illness and serious mental illness (Jones, 2017). Healthcare, especially 
behavioral health care, is a central concern for the Democratic party, potentially resulting in 
lower levels of mental illness. 
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Table 2: Percentage of State Population with Any Mental Illness (%) 
1 Utah 21.4531 
2 Oregon 21.21 
3 Idaho 21.1198 
4 West Virginia 20.7888 
5 Washington 20.2981 
6 Kentucky 19.9762 
7 Rhode Island 19.8372 
8 Arkansas 19.749 
9 Tennessee 19.6143 
10 Indiana 19.5413 
11 Oklahoma 19.5171 
12 Vermont 19.3935 
13 Montana 19.3387 
14 Ohio 19.2778 
15 New Hampshire 19.0637 
16 Alabama 19.0588 
17 Wyoming 18.9966 
18 Maine 18.7897 
19 Massachusetts 18.6272 
20 Missouri 18.6103 
21 Michigan 18.482 
22 Alaska 18.3937 
23 Colorado 18.2534 
24 New Mexico 18.1723 
25 Louisiana 18.172 
26 Mississippi 18.15 
27 Wisconsin 18.114 
28 Nevada 17.9537 
29 Delaware 17.9152 
30 Minnesota 17.8375 
31 Arizona 17.8243 
32 New York 17.706 
33 Virginia 17.6816 
34 Iowa 17.6675 
35 North Carolina 17.6002 
36 South Carolina 17.5968 
37 Pennsylvania 17.5264 
38 Nebraska 17.4503 
39 Kansas 17.3838 
40 Georgia 17.2056 
41 California 17.1272 
42 Connecticut 17.0205 
43 South Dakota 16.8779 
44 Florida 16.521 
45 Maryland 16.519 
46 Hawaii 16.4959 
47 North Dakota 16.4021 
48 Texas 16.0029 
49 Illinois 15.9973 
50 New Jersey 15.8012 
! !
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Table 3: Percentage of State Population with Serious Mental Illness (%) 
1 West Virginia 5.19577 
2 Arkansas 5.08747 
3 Utah 5.03618 
4 Idaho 4.91574 
5 Vermont 4.82918 
6 Kentucky 4.78604 
7 Oregon 4.72756 
8 Montana 4.72322 
9 Indiana 4.70816 
10 Ohio 4.65468 
11 Washington 4.63833 
12 Missouri 4.52946 
13 Oklahoma 4.52024 
14 New Hampshire 4.50527 
15 Rhode Island 4.49716 
16 Maine 4.48643 
17 Tennessee 4.43224 
18 Alabama 4.3984 
19 Colorado 4.29817 
20 Wyoming 4.29114 
21 Michigan 4.28601 
22 Mississippi 4.28122 
23 Iowa 4.19856 
24 North Carolina 4.17084 
25 Arizona 4.16811 
26 Nevada 4.16769 
27 Wisconsin 4.15096 
28 Nebraska 4.1292 
29 New Mexico 4.12472 
30 Alaska 4.11381 
31 Minnesota 4.09798 
32 Louisiana 4.08693 
33 South Carolina 4.07208 
34 Massachusetts 4.07208 
35 Kansas 4.06905 
36 Delaware 3.96566 
37 Pennsylvania 3.91453 
38 Virginia 3.89576 
39 North Dakota 3.88641 
40 South Dakota 3.82355 
41 Georgia 3.8011 
42 New York 3.69673 
43 Florida 3.61078 
44 Illinois 3.58511 
45 Connecticut 3.5291 
46 California 3.50616 
47 Texas 3.46345 
48 New Jersey 3.33769 
49 Hawaii 3.32706 




Table 4: Community Mental Health Block Grant Per Capita (in USD) 
1 Hawaii $20.11 
2 Arizona $19.30 
3 California $19.30 
4 Nevada $19.17 
5 Rhode Island $19.04 
6 Florida $18.64 
7 Oregon $18.05 
8 Georgia $17.68 
9 Washington $17.43 
10 New Jersey $17.33 
11 West Virginia $17.32 
12 Mississippi $17.28 
13 Michigan $17.23 
14 Maryland $17.01 
15 New York $16.89 
16 Arkansas $16.84 
17 Colorado $16.76 
18 Massachusetts $16.71 
19 Alabama $16.71 
20 Kentucky $16.69 
21 Idaho $16.65 
22 South Carolina $16.64 
23 Texas $16.62 
24 Maine $16.58 
25 Tennessee $16.48 
26 Wisconsin $16.30 
27 Montana $16.17 
28 Virginia $16.11 
29 Minnesota $16.01 
30 Vermont $15.99 
31 Connecticut $15.90 
32 New Mexico $15.79 
33 North Carolina $15.65 
34 New Hampshire $15.64 
35 Ohio $15.49 
36 Illinois $15.48 
37 Louisiana $15.47 
38 Missouri $15.40 
39 Pennsylvania $15.24 
40 Indiana $14.70 
41 Oklahoma $14.67 
42 Utah $14.60 
43 Iowa $14.45 
44 Kansas $14.42 
45 Alaska $14.17 
46 South Dakota $13.88 
47 Delaware $13.87 
48 Nebraska $13.81 
49 North Dakota $13.77 




Table 5: Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grant Per Capita (in USD) 
1 Vermont $101.38 
2 North Dakota $90.60 
3 Delaware $81.19 
4 Alaska $80.12 
5 Montana $73.94 
6 Rhode Island $73.78 
7 Wyoming $72.37 
8 California $72.35 
9 South Dakota $71.07 
10 Utah $64.83 
11 New York $63.66 
12 Michigan $62.81 
13 Arizona $62.67 
14 Hawaii $62.36 
15 Ohio $62.00 
16 Maryland $61.28 
17 Louisiana $60.86 
18 Massachusetts $60.33 
19 Nevada $59.36 
20 Illinois $58.62 
21 Florida $58.61 
22 Texas $58.38 
23 New Jersey $58.20 
24 Georgia $57.86 
25 Washington $57.25 
26 Virginia $57.09 
27 New Hampshire $56.26 
28 Maine $56.01 
29 Colorado $55.55 
30 Indiana $53.63 
31 Alabama $53.49 
32 Connecticut $53.29 
33 Oregon $52.43 
34 Wisconsin $52.31 
35 Idaho $52.10 
36 Mississippi $51.68 
37 Tennessee $51.35 
38 Kentucky $51.32 
39 West Virginia $50.96 
40 Pennsylvania $50.68 
41 South Carolina $50.63 
42 Minnesota $50.37 
43 Arkansas $49.89 
44 Oklahoma $49.04 
45 New Mexico $48.78 
46 Missouri $47.79 
47 Iowa $47.40 
48 North Carolina $46.79 
49 Kansas $46.15 
50 Nebraska $45.96 
! !
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Table 6: Total SAMHSA Grant Funding Per Capita (in USD) 
1 Alaska $322.52 
2 Vermont $251.45 
3 Rhode Island $228.45 
4 Montana $212.87 
5 South Dakota $212.21 
6 Delaware $184.08 
7 North Dakota $176.24 
8 New Mexico $158.41 
9 New Hampshire $155.13 
10 Wyoming $147.98 
11 Hawaii $145.55 
12 Massachusetts $137.48 
13 Maine $135.34 
14 Connecticut $134.72 
15 Oklahoma $129.03 
16 West Virginia $124.30 
17 New York $120.14 
18 Maryland $118.81 
19 Nevada $117.28 
20 California $115.85 
21 Colorado $115.17 
22 Oregon $114.73 
23 Arizona $113.54 
24 Idaho $113.30 
25 Kentucky $113.27 
26 Washington $112.54 
27 Utah $112.09 
28 Michigan $110.68 
29 Ohio $109.75 
30 Tennessee $108.82 
31 Louisiana $108.51 
32 Wisconsin $106.95 
33 Illinois $104.43 
34 Iowa $104.35 
35 Florida $103.87 
36 Georgia $102.46 
37 Missouri $100.45 
38 Alabama $99.85 
39 Virginia $99.60 
40 Mississippi $98.09 
41 New Jersey $97.09 
42 Nebraska $96.34 
43 Indiana $94.69 
44 Texas $92.91 
45 South Carolina $91.74 
46 Pennsylvania $91.61 
47 Arkansas $89.69 
48 Minnesota $87.26 
49 Kansas $82.47 




Table 7: Total State Mental Health Agency Funding Per Capita (in USD) 
1 Maine $4,096.79 
2 Alaska $3,443.06 
3 Pennsylvania $3,178.27 
4 Vermont $3,094.14 
5 New York $2,841.43 
6 Arizona $2,573.64 
7 Connecticut $2,327.38 
8 Oregon $2,142.31 
9 Montana $2,136.81 
10 New Jersey $2,085.55 
11 Minnesota $1,996.37 
12 Maryland $1,978.95 
13 California $1,826.52 
14 Iowa $1,667.21 
15 New Hampshire $1,599.98 
16 Hawaii $1,565.02 
17 North Carolina $1,504.39 
18 Michigan $1,438.24 
19 New Mexico $1,394.93 
20 Kansas $1,379.27 
21 Washington $1,376.00 
22 Nevada $1,351.53 
23 Colorado $1,313.44 
24 Wyoming $1,278.57 
25 Massachusetts $1,259.31 
26 Rhode Island $1,137.55 
27 Mississippi $1,123.71 
28 Delaware $1,116.92 
29 Wisconsin $1,071.81 
30 Missouri $1,041.82 
31 Ohio $1,025.27 
32 Virginia $1,017.17 
33 Tennessee $996.90 
34 West Virginia $963.79 
35 North Dakota $959.12 
36 South Dakota $942.70 
37 Indiana $901.77 
38 Nebraska $841.72 
39 Alabama $825.06 
40 Illinois $803.00 
41 Utah $749.43 
42 South Carolina $689.98 
43 Louisiana $635.63 
44 Oklahoma $628.55 
45 Georgia $596.11 
46 Kentucky $586.86 
47 Arkansas $463.29 
48 Idaho $437.39 
49 Texas $430.83 




There are a few states that have high levels of mental illness for both any mental illness 
and serious mental illness, appearing among the highest ten in both tables. Arkansas, Idaho, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Oregon, Utah, and West Virginia have among the ten highest levels of both 
any mental illness and serious mental illness, showing that both categories of mental illness are 
prevalent and related. 
Table 6 ranks the states based on the total amount of SAMHSA funding per capita. This 
accounts for all funding, including the MHBG and SABG, among many other grant programs 
such as those of regional and national significance. The previously mentioned states, with high 
levels of both any mental illness and serious mental illness, are not among those receiving the 
highest amounts of total funding. In regards to all states, the total amount of funding ranges from 
$81.60 to $322.52 per capita, further emphasizing the gap between states in addressing 
behavioral health. 
Table 7 portrays state mental health agency expenditures per capita, ranked by state. The 
range of funding varies greatly, from $419.18 to $4096.79 per capita. This gap is likely a result 
of population differences and behavioral health prioritization within states, as well as state 
revenue. In relation to levels of mental illness, a few states have among the highest state mental 
health agency expenditures and among the top levels of any mental illness and serious mental 
illness. This shows that these states are attempting to combat such high levels of mental illness 
with state funding. Although, there are a few states that have among the top highest state mental 
health agency expenditures, yet the lowest levels of any mental illness and serious mental illness. 
This could suggest that these states are more effective in abating mental illness with state 
funding. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, there are a few states that have relatively high levels 
of any mental illness and serious mental illness, but have low levels of state mental health 
agency expenditures. This suggests that these states do not provide enough financial support 
from their respective mental health agencies in combating mental illness, thus resulting in higher 
mental illness prevalence.  
 
Regression Model and Results 
I use regression analysis to empirically examine the effect of my hypothesized factors on 
federal grants allocated to states. Specifically, I construct a pooled cross-sectional time-series 
data set. The unit of analysis is state-year. I estimate equation 1 as specified using an Ordinary 
Least Squares model with standard errors clustered at the state level. The model provides R2 
values ranging from 0.395 to 0.894.  
 
Yst = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + β4x4 + ɑ1 + εst                                (1) 
 
Three types of funding are included as dependent variables, yST, including MHBG per 
capita funding, SABG per capita funding, and total SAMHSA funding received by a state, s, in a 
given year, t. These three dependent variables are measured as the natural logarithms of the 
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funding per capita. Problem severity variables are represented by x1, state government capacity is 
represented by x2, political motivation variables are represented by x3, and control variables are 
represented by x4. The variable ɑ1 denotes year dummies to account for common changes and 
shocks to all states in a given year. Lastly, εST represents the error term. 
To examine the correlation between the independent variables, Table 8 reports the 
correlation matrix. As expected, Table 8 shows that levels of any mental illness have a strong 
positive correlation with levels of serious mental illness. Among other variables, there are 
moderate correlations. As suggested in the literature, higher levels of mental illness are related to 
lower income (Hollingshead and Redlich, 1958; Linn et al., 1985; Sturm and Gresenz, 2002). 
Table 8 shows that levels of any mental illness and serious mental illness are negatively 
correlated with personal income, meaning lower income is related to higher levels of mental 
illness.  
In terms of negative relationships, levels of any mental illness and serious mental illness 
are both negatively and weakly related to state mental health agency expenditures. If 
expenditures were obtained and allocated based on public choice theory, levels of mental illness 
would be positive and strongly related to state mental health agency expenditures.  
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Table 8: Correlation Matrix 
 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 
X1 1.0000             
X2 0.8275 1.0000            
X3 -0.0711 -0.1126 1.0000           
X4 0.1154 0.0134 0.2371 1.0000          
X5 -0.2142 -0.2608 -0.1580 -0.0908 1.0000         
X6 -0.2097 -0.2897 -0.0456 0.0096 0.4780 1.0000        
X7 0.0543 0.0278 0.1910 0.1142 -0.1211 0.0222 1.0000       
X8 0.2144 0.0483 -0.0742 0.0684 0.2028 0.1400 -0.0181 1.0000      
X9 -0.3783 -0.3601 0.4159 0.1194 -0.0115 0.2343 0.1771 -0.4046 1.0000     
X10 0.1346 0.1498 -0.3482 -0.1551 0.2229 -0.0074 -0.1950 0.4519 -0.5930 1.0000    
X11 -0.2009 -0.2670 -0.1499 0.0360 0.7799 0.6079 -0.0399 0.2948 0.0157 0.2420 1.0000   
X12 -0.1446 0.0142 0.2630 0.1161 -0.1074 -0.0277 -0.0243 -0.3625 0.4285 -0.1728 0.0031 1.0000  
X13 -0.1949 -0.2132 -0.2830 -0.1234 0.2429 0.2191 -0.0546 0.2470 -0.1576 0.4155 0.4002 -0.1040 1.0000 
 
Note:  
X1 denotes the proportion of the state population with any mental illness 
X2 denotes the proportion of the state population with serious mental illness 
X3 denotes annual state mental health agency (SMHA) expenditures per capita 
X4 denotes a state with a Democratic governor 
X5 denotes the proportion of representatives from a state in the House majority party 
X6 denotes that a state has at least one Representative on the House Ways and Means Committee 
X7 denotes that a state has at least one Senator on the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee 
X8 denotes the unemployment rate 
X9 denotes personal income per capita 
X10 denotes the poverty rate 
X11 denotes state population  
X12 denotes a state’s Medicaid expansion status 
X13 denotes the proportion of the state population that is black 
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Table 9 reports the estimation results based on the regression analysis. Overall, the results 
point to political motivation as having a strong influence on grant funding.  
 
!
Note:  All specifications include year fixed effects. *** = p < .01, ** = p < .05, * = p < .10  
 Values in parentheses represent standard errors clustered by state. 
  
Table 9: Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis Results  
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Observations 500 500 500 
R2 0.395 0.894 0.521 
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In regards to my hypotheses, this study provides mixed results. Hypothesis 1 states that 
greater levels of any mental illness and serious mental illness in a state lead to greater grant 
funding for that state. However, I do not find a statistically significant effect between these 
variables. This may be due to individuals with serious mental illness receiving financial support 
from other programs such as Medicaid or the Department of Veterans Affairs. This could also be 
due to a state injecting more of its own funding into combating mental illness, rather than 
receiving support from the federal level. Although a central purpose of the MHBG is to support 
services for individuals with serious mental illness, this result shows an opposite effect. All 
coefficients for any mental illness and serious mental illness lack statistical significance. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts greater state mental health agency financial capacity, measured by 
annual spending, to be related to greater funding. The results do not show a statistically 
significant relationship between the variables. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is also not supported by 
my estimation results. 
State Medicaid expansion accounts for whether a state has expanded their Medicaid 
program under the Affordable Care Act. Hypothesis 3 argues that a state with expanded 
Medicaid receive less federal funding through SAMHSA-funded programs. The coefficients 
show that Medicaid expansion is positively related to funding (statistically significant) through  
the SABG. The estimated coefficients suggest that a state with Medicaid expansion is expected 
to experience a 10% increase in its receipt of SABG funding. This finding is not consistent with 
my hypothesis and could be associated with the fact that states with expanded Medicaid 
programs are likely more politically liberal. Therefore, these states are more likely to apply for 
and receive grants that combat social issues such as behavioral illness. A state with expanded 
Medicaid likely holds substance abuse prevention and treatment as a central government value. 
A state’s Medicaid expansion status is therefore related to greater federal SAMHSA grant 
funding.  
 As for political factors, my results indicate that the presence of a Democratic governor 
has no statistically significant effect on a state’s receipt of federal mental health program 
funding. I find that the proportion of Representatives in the House majority party has a positive 
correlation (statistically significant at one percent level) with the grant a state receives through 
SABG and total grant awards from SAMHSA, which is consistent with Hypothesis 5. Column 1 
shows that a one percent increase in house majority representation results in a four percent 
increase in SABG funding per capita. Column 3 shows that a one percent increase in house 
majority representation also results in a nearly five percent increase in total SAMHSA funding 
per capita.  
 Hypothesis 6 states the importance of congressional committee membership. The first 
part of this measures whether a state has at least one representative on the Ways and Means 
Committee. The effect of this variable on SAMHSA funding is not statistically significant. The 
House Ways and Means Committee is comprised of six subcommittees, including Health, 
Oversight, Social Security, Select Revenue Measures, Trade, and Worker and Family Support. A 
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representative on this committee may be a member of a subcommittee unrelated to health, 
diverting funds for their state to non-health sectors.  
The Senate committee variable shows whether a state has at least one Senator on the 
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee. HELP membership is positively related to 
Total Funding, as expected, yet is negatively related to the two block grants. Column 2 shows 
that membership on this committee is related to a decrease of two percent for MHBG funding per 
capita. Senators on this committee may obtain healthcare funding for their state through 
programs other than SAMHSA, such as Medicaid. Medicaid remains the largest source of 
funding for mental health services in the nation. Senators on this committee likely prioritize 
healthcare and likely obtain funding for mental health through Medicaid, accounting for this 
decrease in funding through the MHBG.  
Aside from political motivation, this study finds multiple control variables to have 
significance as well. State unemployment rate is positively related with all three types of 
funding, and the variable’s coefficients are statistically significant for MHBG funding and total 
funding per capita, evident in Column 2 and Column 3. A one percent increase in the 
unemployment rate is related to a one percent increase in MHBG funding per capita and a three 
percent increase in total funding per capita. This is consistent with my expectation that greater 
levels of unemployment are related to greater levels of federal funding. 
Personal income per capita has a positive, statistically significant effect for total 
SAMHSA funding, shown in Column 3. A one-dollar increase in personal income per capita is 
related to a one percent increase in total funding per capita. This is inconsistent with the previous 
expectation that personal income would have an inverse relationship with federal funding. Low 
income is a qualifying factor for Medicaid enrollment, likely driving Medicaid funding to low 
income areas. Therefore, higher income areas may receive more funding from SAMHSA since 
they have fewer low income residents qualifying for Medicaid.  
 I also find that a one percent increase in a state’s population is related with a decrease in 
SABG funding by over 14 percent and a decrease in total funding by over 27 percent, seen in 
Column 1 and 3, respectively. Although, Column 2 shows that population is positively related to 
MHBG, with a one percent increase in population resulting in a three percent increase in MHBG 
funding.  
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This study evaluates the impact of several factors on the allocation of federal SAMHSA 
grants for mental health and substance use. The results show that states with certain 
characteristics receive more support through federal grants from SAMHSA. Namely, this study 
finds that states with a higher proportion of representatives in the House majority, lower 
participation on the Senate HELP committee, higher unemployment rates, higher income per 
capita, lower population levels, and enacted Medicaid expansion receive greater levels of grants 
from SAMHSA. 
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Mental illness prevalence was hypothesized to be highly correlated with SAMHSA 
funding. However, the mental illness variables are generally insignificant for predicting federal 
funding on mental health programs. This finding is likely due to funding from other programs 
such as Medicaid, Medicare, and through the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). It may also 
suggest that the formula utilized by SAMHSA needs revision to include a more accurate 
measurement of public healthcare needs.  
The relationship between state capacity and funding is positive, as expected, but also 
lacks significance. Perhaps a state that spends more on mental health does not need federal 
assistance. Considering state capacity per capita, perhaps a less populous state needs less federal 
support due to the low population. Some states may also prioritize social welfare programs more 
than others, resulting in a decreased need for federal support due to higher state spending.  
The financial capacity of a state mental health agency may boost federal funding because 
the agency has sufficient capacity to apply for federal grants; however, the MHBG and SABG 
are not reimbursable grants, meaning the recipient state mental health agency does not need to 
match funding from these programs.  
 There are a handful of limitations to this study. The first is regarding the grant data 
utilized in the analysis. Grant data is obtained from USA Spending and spans from 2007-2017. 
Although the MHBG was created in 1981, the SABG created in 1993, and SAMHSA itself 
created in 1992, the grant data available is patchy. There are very few grant awards listed 
through USA Spending in the early 2000s, despite SAMHSA’s distribution of funds beginning 
almost a decade prior. Because of this gap in grant data, it is likely that the entire grant data set is 
flawed.  
 The second weakness in this study is in analyzing the effects of key congressional 
committee membership on grant allocation. While the House Ways and Means and Senate HELP 
Committees have influence over state and locality funding through bills and resolutions, they 
have little influence over agency funding. These two committees affect other grants and 
programs applied for by SMHAs and localities, therefore affecting funding on a potentially 
smaller scale. Congresspersons on these two committees can “send” funding to their state or 
district, but they lack influence over SAMHSA and other federal agency funding. Instead, 
SAMHSA operates within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which is 
administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services within the executive branch. In 
order to remedy this limitation, this study could have included the effects of membership on the 
House and Senate Appropriations Committees instead. The House and Senate Appropriations 
Committees are the groups that receive annual budget proposals from SAMHSA directly and 
approve or disapprove requests.  
 The third limitation in this study regards the formula used by SAMHSA to determine 
block grant funding to states and localities. Although there is a supposed formula to determine 
these grants, this formula is not explicitly stated anywhere. The SAMHSA website lists a few 
main factors in the SABG formula, including “total personal income, resident population, total 
taxable resources, population data for the territories, and a cost of services index comprised of 
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fair market rents and mean hourly (non-manufacturing) wages” (SAMHSA, Fact Sheet, para. 5). 
There are other pieces taken into account when allocating these grants though, including details 
within the application required for funding. Having access to the full formula would allow for a 
more clear direction of this research, with potentially new variables not analyzed in this study. 
Not having access to the full formula creates obscurity and leaves room for influence based on 
political motivation. 
 Lastly, this study is affected by the potential omitted variable bias. In addition to other 
variables included in the vaguely described SAMHSA grant formula, there may be other 
influences on these grants. This study provides a combination of factors affecting grant 
allocation as based on the literature. While this study focuses on the impact of political factors, 
among others, there may be omitted variables that have a major impact on grant allocation. 
Future research can be conducted to fill the gaps in this study, and to expand on the 
current findings. Inclusion of more variables might explain the trends in grant allocation and 
eliminate the omitted variable bias of this study. A more granular study of grants to localities and 
local explanatory variables may diminish variability. Finally, an inclusion of qualitative methods, 
such as interviews, may more accurately pinpoint how funding decisions are made at the federal 
level. Interviews of funding stakeholders may provide information on unobserved factors, 
especially to supplement an empirical analysis. 
The results of this study may provide useful implications for policy makers. First, 
political motivation is a factor affecting grant allocation for programs aimed at helping unwell 
populations. Funding for social programs should not be based on politics, especially programs 
related to health. With politics as a primary factor determining federal funding, many 
populations may not receive appropriate support for health concerns as needed.  
Second, grants for behavioral health are not related to the levels of behavioral illness in a 
state. Although there are other programs that provide funding to lower level governments for 
behavioral health, funding from SAMHSA should be related to the populations it serves. Despite 
the inclusion of population data in block grant formulas, the data does not reflect the problem 
severity within states. Grant formulas should include the most recent mental illness prevalence 
data, such as that of the NSDUH. 
Similarly, the final lesson for policy makers is the importance of funding mechanisms. 
SAMHSA has a vaguely stated grant allocation formula, and the results of this study point to 
political influences on grant allocation as well. Federal funding is important for many sectors and 
lower level governments and should operate through public choice theory. Federal funding 
mechanisms should be strongly related to the problems they address, in order to truly combat 
such social problems through public choice theory. Grant writers and policy makers should 
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